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1. Introduction 
  A substantial theoretical literature investigates how competition for a patent 
affects dynamic competition, the level of investment in research and the rate of 
innovation.  Under some circumstances, competition – a patent race - efficiently enhances 
investments in research; in others it (in theory) leads to excessive expenditures on 
invention, preemptive patenting, and delayed innovation.  The lack of suitable data on 
patent races has hindered an evaluation of either the importance or the consequences of 
actual patent races.
1  
  This paper explores a rich source of information on patent races: U.S. patent 
interference cases.  Patent interferences are the means by which the U. S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) resolves priority disputes between patent applicants.  The 
disputes center around the discrepancy between the date at which each litigant 
purportedly invented the technology and the date at which he filed for patent protection. 
The cases thus provide a window into the decisions of firms about the timing of research 
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1  There are very few empirical studies of patent racing per se.  The topic was taken up by Cockburn and 
Henderson (1995) in a case study of the ethical drug industry, who find no support for “winner-take-all” 
patent races.     
  2and innovation and about the impact of patent policies on those decisions. 
In this paper, we find support for the classic Arrovian hypothesis that incumbents 
delay the introduction of innovations relative to challenger firms.
2   We derive an 
empirical model to test strategic filing behavior and show that while incumbents would 
prefer to delay introduction of innovations, they respond to competitors’ patent filings by 
accelerating the filing of their own patent applications.  In other words, a patent race 
leads to racing, in this case mitigating the incentive of incumbents to delay innovation. 
  The tests rest on identifying interferences with patent races, and hence the actions 
of litigants with strategic choices to obtain or lock up patent rights.  The first part of this 
paper presents data on the distribution of interferences across technology categories to 
argue that the cases are consistent with strategic racing but not with (or not exclusively 
with) alternative reasons for why an interference might arise.  Consistent with theoretical 
studies of patent races, the incidence of interferences is concentrated in technology 
categories where patent rights are generally thought of as strong, such as chemicals and 
drugs, and is very low in electronic and computer categories.  It differs in significant 
ways from the incidence of patent infringement litigation, which suggests that the 
observed pattern of interferences reflects broader industry research duplication rates 
rather than the non-representative preferences of particular parties for litigation.   
  This study also provides some information about the institution of U.S. patent 
interference.  Patent interferences exist to support the unique American first-to-invent 
patent standard.  All other countries award patents to the inventor who first files for a 
patent on the invention.  This has led to calls for the U.S. to change its priority standard 
                                                 
2  Arrow (1962), Reinganum (1982).  Our results add support to the case studies and surveys that also 
provide empirical support for the incentives of incumbents to delay.  See Lerner (1997), Czarnitzki and 
Kraft (2004). 
  3in the interest of further patent harmonization with other countries,
3 and has renewed 
interest in the value of the interference process.
4   
  We find that the impact of the priority standard on patent activity is not benign.  
While interference cases are rare – only 1400 were declared between 1988 and 1994 – 
their incidence among strong-patent technologies is nearly as high as, and in the case of 
biotechnology patents, higher than estimates of infringement rates.
5   Furthermore, the 
assignment of rights under the first-to-invent and first-to-file rules are more likely to 
differ for less derivative patents, arguably the patents of greatest interest to innovation 
policy.  At the same time, we find little evidence that the interference procedure benefits 
the small firms who have traditionally been served up as the main course in defense of 
the priority standard.  Indeed, most of the firms that participate in patent interference 
cases are very large, consistent with the expectation that patent races are the province of 
corporate research laboratories with well-defined goals and good information about the 
activities of the competition.  Finally, and perhaps most troubling, our evidence suggests 
that the first-to-invent policy undermines potentially desirable aspects of patent races, and 
thus may have an impact on innovation well beyond the firms that wind up in formal 
interference litigation.
6   
  The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section introduces the patent 
interference process, provides some details about when and how the process can be used 
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4  Lemley and Chien (2003), Mossinghoff (2002).  Another recent study of interferences that raises some of 
the issues addressed here is Kingston (2004). 
5   The incidence of interferences appears to have dropped in the late 1990s, but due to the long lag in the 
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6  Our conclusions are anticipated by Gholtz (2000).  
  4and presents summary statistics about interferences.  Section 3 discusses the rates of 
interfering in different technology categories and discusses our strategy for identifying 
interferences as patent races.  We then relate the actions of litigants and outcomes in 
interference cases to the incumbency-challenger debate.  Section 4 contains an empirical 
model of strategic filing, section 5 discusses the independent variables, and section 6 
contains regression results.  Section 7 returns to patent interference policy issues, and 
concludes. 
 
2. Interference Cases at the US Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
  U.S. patent priority rules are currently based on the principle that the first person 
who invents a patentable invention should receive the patent.  When two or more parties 
claim to satisfy  that standard, a patent examiner can declare an interference proceeding 
to determine priority.
7   Interference cases and rules are remarkably complex, and we 
discuss here only general issues that affect the way that we formulate our hypotheses and 
interpret our results.
8
2.1. Declaring an interference. 
  An interference declaration has two main components.  First, the patent examiner 
identifies one of the parties as the senior party and the other party (or parties) as the 
junior party (junior parties).  Each party is awarded a “benefit date,” which is a starting 
point for the determination of priority.  The senior party has the earliest benefit date.  The 
other key piece of the interference declaration is the “count” (or counts) which state 
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shots.   
8   See Kingston (2004) for an overview of Patent Interference practices, and Lipscomb (1986) for details, 
including a history. 
  5precisely what technology is in dispute.  The declaration also identifies which claims in 
the patents or patent applications of the parties correspond to the interference count.  The 
senior party starts out with a  presumption of priority, and the junior party has the burden 
of proof to show that he invented first.    
  The PTO issues a final decision or judgment in all cases, which states the 
resolution of the disputed technology.  In about a quarter of the cases, the Board of Patent 
Appeals holds a final hearing presided over by administrative judges.
 9  The remaining 
cases settle before a hearing, usually when one party relinquishes his claim by requesting 
an adverse judgment, at which point the remaining party is awarded priority and can 
either seek or retain the patent.  The cases that settle typically do so after a patent 
examiner has issued some preliminary findings, and also after the parties agree to 
additional, confidential settlement terms that may involve licensing the technology or 
sharing other technology.  Interferences declared between 1988 and 1994 concluded in an 
average of 623 days, with a minimum time of sixteen days and a maximum of over ten 
years.
10   
2.2 Types of Interferences 
  Unlike infringement cases, private parties cannot sue for interference.  However, 
they can alert patent examiners to a potential interference, and request that one be 
declared.  Knowledge of a potential interference arises in three circumstances which 
define the three distinct types of interferences.  Patent examiners identify an interference 
                                                 
9  The cases are simpler – and much cheaper – than infringement suits.  A key difference is in the rules of 
discovery which is very limited in the interference setting.  See Gholtz (2001) for a comparison of the 
interference and infringement cases.  Like all administrative decisions, BPAI decisions can be appealed to 
the federal courts. 
10  These statistics are based on our sample, described below.  No comparable statistics for the population 
of interferences exist, but these numbers, and the other characteristics described here, are very close to 
those published by Calvert and Sofocleous (1989; 1992; 1995) for the population of patents distributed in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
  6when it involves two applications (“applicant only”).  Applications are sent to examiners 
at the PTO who specialize by technology so that two interfering applications would most 
likely be examined by the same examiner, and certainly in the same group.  Second, the 
junior party may identify, and request, an interference when the senior party has a 
recently issued patent, and the junior party has an application pending before the PTO 
(“senior party patentee”).   Both applicant-only and senior-party-patentee cases are called 
interferences “for” the junior party, as they provide an opportunity for the junior party to 
claim rights that would otherwise be assigned to the senior party. 
  The third and most common form of interference is when the senior party requests 
one based on the recently-issued patent of the junior party (“junior party patentee”).
11  
Here, the senior party usually files his application after the junior party, but obtains filing 
priority by having either a foreign patent or a parent patent.  Thus the benefit date for the 
senior party corresponds to the application filing date for a different patent that 
incorporates the technology that corresponds to the interference count.  This form of 
interference is considered an interference “for” the senior party, who has an opportunity 
to dispute a patent awarded to the junior party.  Table 1 gives the incidence of each of 
these forms of interference and the basis for the benefit dates awarded to the junior and 
senior parties. 
2.3 Interference Outcomes 
  Whether the interference is resolved by settlement or the BPAI, the result is one 
of four outcomes.  The subject matter can be awarded to the senior party or to one of the 
junior parties.  These are the possible “priority outcomes” for the case, and are the focus 
                                                 
11 Interferences where both parties have patents are rare, but also possible.  They are litigated by federal 
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  7of sections 4, 5 and 6.   
  A third possibility is that the examiner or the BPAI will decide that the claims of 
the parties do not correspond to the count, and that their applications are in fact for 
separate inventions.  These cases are coded as both parties winning.
12   Finally, since 
1984 the BPAI has made patent validity determinations in the course of an interference.
13  
In some cases, it rules that neither party can patent the technology.  We code this as “both 
lose”.
 14  Generally one party will lose on priority grounds, and the other on one of the 
standard reasons for patent invalidity such as prior art or failure to disclose best practice 
in the application.
15   Table 2 shows the distribution of outcomes.   
2.4. Characteristics of interferences: sample statistics 
  Our sample is composed of 668 interferences that involve 1424 applicants.
16  The 
cases correspond to a 50% random sample of the interference numbers assigned to cases 
declared between 1988 and 1994.  Tables 3 - 7 provide some information about 
characteristics of the interference cases.  Interference parties are heavily weighted 
towards domestic corporate inventors relative to all applicants for U.S. patents.  The 
shares reflect Kingston’s (2004) observation that interferences are more likely to arise in 
corporate research settings, as corporations would be more likely to set similar goals – in 
brief, to enter a well-identified patent race.  The same observation appears to apply to 
university research.  While the cell sizes are modest, our sample has a healthy 
                                                 
12 This category includes cases ruled to have “no interference in fact” and those with split awards where it 
appears as if neither party’s split includes the lion’s share of  value. 
13  35 USCS sec. 135(a), PL 98-622 sec. 202, 98 Stat 3386 (1984). 
14  A fairly common progression in these cases is that the party who anticipates losing on priority will try to 
claim no-interference-in-fact; if that is unsuccessful, he will introduce evidence challenging the validity of 
the other party’s application or patent.  Thus issues of both patent scope and patent validity are common 
grist for patent interference cases.  This raises the fascinating question of whether the patent interference-
type institution could substitute for that of a federal district court.   
15  Material in an interference count is supposed to be patentable.  See Lipscomb (1986), p. 342, 343. 
16  See the data appendix for sources and our sampling methodology.    
  8representation of university applicants: over four percent compared to 1.4% in the 
population of patents at that time. 
  Even restricting the comparison to corporate patentees, those involved in 
interference cases are much larger, from a patenting standpoint, than the typical patenting 
corporation.  Tables 4 and 5 present comparison data calculated from the NBER 
database.
17  Using any standard – mean portfolio, 75
th, 90
th, 95
th percentile, controlling 
for technology class – our sample assignees are huge.   
  The research activities of junior and senior parties are largely commensurate for 
our sample. (see Tables 6 and 7)  Overall, junior parties are somewhat larger than the 
senior parties, and while the difference is statistically significant,  it does not hold across 
technology categories. 
 
3.  Patent Races and Interference Rates 
  A primary concern for this study is that the interference data are representative of 
patent races.  While some such races presumably do result in an interference, others 
would not: interferences are only declared when the parties file in close proximity and 
when each can make an argument for invention priority.  Races where one party 
recognizes his probable defeat and abandons the project would not end in an interference.  
Thus our sample can represent only the subset of races where researchers pursue the 
invention to its conclusion, and where the race has a photo-finish perspective. 
  A second problem is that interferences may arise for other reasons.  Inventors may 
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  9duplicate research projects through random selection of an invention topic.  Firms may 
undertake a frivolous interference to hold up a competitor in litigation.  While we cannot 
rule out either of these options on the basis of our data, the distribution of interferences 
across technology categories provides strong support that patent racing is an important 
aspect of interfering claims.   
  The classic patent races involve a group of firms intent on inventing the same 
well-defined product.  Because the patent system decrees that the first firm to invent 
receives at least a disproportionate share of the invention reward, and because each firm’s 
investment decreases the likelihood that other firms will be first, the firms impose 
negative externalities on each other.  More firms will be looking for the same product,  
invention will be faster, and aggregate research expenditures will be greater than is 
jointly optimal for the firms.  When firms strategize by taking into account the research 
plans of competitors, a contest, or strategic patent race ensues.   
  Reinganum (1982; 1989) emphasizes the role of appropriability in how races 
proceed.  The ratio of “leader” to “follower” benefits defines the extent to which an 
inventor can appropriate the social value of his patent, or, in this context, the strength of a 
patent.  When patents are strong, an increase in the number of firms increases per firm 
investment.  When patents are weak the reverse relationship holds.  Putting the results 
together, we expect to find too many firms in all innovative industries with unrestricted 
entry and valuable patent opportunities.
18  But if strategic racing is at play, interferences 
will be concentrated in industries with strong patent rights (drugs, chemical formulae), as 
such industries are predicted to have greater per-firm spending and hence a higher 
                                                 
18  Note that “too many” is relative to a coordinated profit-maximizing effort by the firms, not social 
welfare.  
  10likelihood of multiple invention within a short enough period of time to trigger an 
interference than are industries with weak patents (electronics, computers).
19   
Using the interference process for strategic litigation has different implications for 
the distribution of cases.  Certainly a spurious interference has potential value.  It may 
impose litigation costs and delay issuance of a patent to a competitor.  To avoid the delay 
and costs, the meritorious litigant might settle with the interferer, and agree to attractive 
licensing terms, technology sharing, or other fruits of extortion common to infringement 
settlements. This process appears harder to abuse as  interferences are declared by patent 
examiners, but, as is discussed above, litigants have a role in identifying potential cases.
20    
  Infringement rates are a proxy for this kind of behavior.  Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) find a strong correlation between the probability that a patent is 
involved in infringement litigation and the characteristics of both the patent technology 
and the patent owners that make litigation attractive or unavoidable, including  ease of 
settlement, litigation know-how and the benefits of tying up competitors in litigation.  
These features carry over directly to the interference milieu.  
  As with infringement, legal confusion or unsettled law could also give rise to 
interference cases.  When it is unclear whether two parties have filed for separate or 
interfering patents, an examiner can declare an interference to settle the extent of each 
parties’ claims.  If this explanation is correct,  the computer software and biotechnology 
categories will be over-represented in interferences.  Finally, random duplication of 
research activities, randomly resulting in duplicate patent applications, suggests that the 
                                                 
19  There is remarkable agreement among empirical economists about the technologies characterized by 
strong versus weak patents.  See Cohen et al (1997) and Schankerman (1998). 
20 An administrative proceeding may have a number of advantages over civil suits, including its greater 
apparent resistance to abuse by participants.  See Jaffe and Lerner (2004), Hall et al., (2003), Kingston 
(2000).  For a more skeptical view, see Lemley (2001). 
  11distribution of interferences would approximate the distribution for all patent 
applications.   
  Calculating the rate of interference from our data requires dealing with a 
truncation problem complicated by two issues: first, the rapid growth in the number of 
applications filed at the USPTO during the 1980s and early 1990s, and second, the 
concurrent changes in the shares of applications accounted for by each of the different 
technology categories.  The appendix describes a methodology for dealing with 
truncation.   
  The results are summarized in tables 8 and 9 (see Appendix Table 1 for details).  
The likelihood that an application is involved in an interference in this period is from half 
to one-third the magnitude that it will be involved in infringement litigation.  In the 
chemical and drug technologies, the likelihood is roughly equivalent or slightly higher, 
while in biotechnology we estimate the interference rate at twice the infringement rate: 
5% of biotechnology applications enter into interference.  If, as is argued earlier, 
interference represents the tip of a patent race iceberg, these estimates imply that a 
substantial number of patent races – and possibly substantial duplication of research 
effort – occurs in the biomedical and biotechnology fields. 
  We easily reject the hypothesis that the rates are equal in the different technology 
categories.  The estimates of interference rates closely correlate to both estimates and 
conventional wisdom about when patents provide strong protection for intellectual 
property.  The interference rate for chemicals is 1.46 times greater than the average and 
drugs are interfered at over three times the average.  Computers and electrical patents are 
interfered at only half the average rate.  Breaking the drug category into smaller 
  12technology subcategories shows that, while the rates are high in all of the subcategories, 
they are highest for inventions that correspond to chemical formulae, and lower for 
medical equipment.   
  The final two columns in tables 8 and 9 present estimates from two sources of the 
rate at which patents are involved in infringement litigation before the federal district 
courts.  The estimate that incorporates data from the 1990s (second column) is nearly 
twice that of the first column, but both give very similar relative rates.  
  The rates for drugs and for the drug categories are among the higher relative rates 
for both types of patent litigation.  But the similarity stops there.  Interference rates are 
high for chemicals, while in infringement suits, chemicals patents are litigated at only 
half the average rate.  Alternatively, the computer and electrical rates are the lowest for 
all interferences, at about half the average rate, while the estimates for infringement place 
computer rates at well above average and electrical rates at 80 to 90 percent of the 
average.  Within the drug category, interference rates are high for actual chemical 
compositions – biotechnology drugs and other drugs -- and lower for medical equipment 
(although it is still nearly twice the average).  On the infringement side, medical 
equipment has the highest litigation rate, with biotechnology and other drugs closer to 
average. 
  Results are mixed for the unsettled law hypothesis: the interference rate for 
biotechnology is very high, while that for computers is the lowest of all of the technology 
categories.  Taken together these rates raise an interesting possibility.  While unsettled 
law alone may not be able to drive priority litigation, it might at least contribute in that 
examiners declare interferences or parties request them in a greater fraction of potential 
  13cases.  Supporting this view is the high rate of non-priority determinations in both 
biotechnology and computers (see Table 2).  However, we caution against viewing these 
numbers as more than intriguing trends, as the cell sizes are small. 
  Overall, the table supports our identification strategy.  Interference rates are far 
from uniform across technology categories.  High interference rates are found in 
technologies with strong effective patent rights; low interference rates characterize the 
industries with weak effective patent rights.  Abusive litigation does not appear to drive 
the interference rates.  Finally, our estimates suggest that unsettled law may play a role in 
interferences, but more extensive data are necessary to determine how important the 
phenomenon may be. 
 
4. Dynamic competition: an empirical model of strategic filing 
  If interferences are representative of patent races, then we can use their outcomes 
to investigate the nature and consequences of competition for patents.  We consider here 
two issues related to innovation: first, that incumbent firms prefer to delay the 
introduction of new products relative to challengers, and second, that competition for a 
patent overcomes part of the incumbency delay.   
  A key hypothesis that emerges from the theoretical literature on innovation is that 
incumbents might prefer to delay introducing a new good relative to challengers because 
the new good cannibalizes revenue from their current product.   A marketing delay 
should mean a delay in filing for a patent for three reasons: first, the patenting expenses 
are delayed until the firm is ready to market its invention.  Second, delaying filing and 
patent issuance deprives competitors of the information that an application divulges about 
  14the invention.  Finally, the limited patent term is scheduled when most valuable: when the 
product is actually sold rather than in part when the product is being readied for sale. 
  Delaying a patent until the firm is ready to market is an attractive strategy for any 
firm.   However, the attraction varies by firm.  Small firms, particularly start-ups, rely on 
their patent portfolio for financing.  In cases where development and marketing are 
undertaken by entities other than the inventor, patents are critical to commercialization.  
Universities, startups and government agencies are less likely to employ a filing-delay 
strategy than are large corporations.  Thus, while filing delays are not restricted to 
incumbent firms, the “Arrow” hypothesis predicts that, ceteris paribus, they will delay 
more because their target marketing date is later than for challenger firms.  
  If a competitor files for a patent in the interim the delaying firm is in trouble.  The 
U.S. patent system, with its first-to-invent priority structure, is gentle to procrastinators, 
since a firm can file in response to the filing of a competitor and still obtain the patent.  
However, junior parties in interference cases are at a formal disadvantage: they carry the 
burden of proof to establish an early invention date and need to show diligence in 
reducing the invention to practice.
21  Furthermore, if junior parties first file for a patent 
after the senior party has not only filed but been granted a patent, then the standard of 
proof on the junior party rises from a preponderance of evidence to the more stringent 
beyond reasonable doubt.  Finally, if the junior party delays filing beyond a year from the 
issue date of the senior party’s patent, technically he loses the option of entering an 
interference.  Thus, potential penalties to tardy filing exist in law, even in a first-to-invent 
patent system.   
To investigate strategic delay and strategic acceleration, consider the following 
                                                 
21 See Lipscomb, p. 363. 
  15stylized model of the patent filing and BPAI ruling process.  Suppose at most one of the 
two firms in interference is an incumbent.
22  Denote the incumbent and challenger by 
subscripts I and C respectively, i and c are their respective invention dates,  TI and TC are 
the earliest dates at which I and C could file their patent applications, tI* and tC* are the 
“ideal” dates subsequent to the earliest date at which they would file if they faced no 
competition from each other, and tC and tI are the dates that they actually file. 
(4.1) TC = c + X1C γ1 + Z1 ω1  
 T I  = i + X1I γ1 + Z1 ω1  
X1 are the characteristics that vary across inventors that affect the filing process.  
Z1 are the characteristics that affect the filing process that may vary across technologies 
but not across inventors working on the same technology.  As interference cases depend 
on the difference in the timing, TC – TI, and not the absolute timing (TC, TI), Z1 have no 
impact on our analysis. 
  Assume that challengers receive no challenger-specific benefit from delayed 
filing and thus file as soon as they can, so that tC = tC* = TC.  An incumbent, 
alternatively, would prefer to delay and file subsequent to the earliest date: 
(4.2) tI* = TI + γ*IncI = i + X1I γ1 + Z1ω1 +  γ*IncI  ≥  TI
where γ* is the desired delay due to incumbency incentives and IncI  measures the extent 
to which the firm is an incumbent. 
  If the incumbent firm files subsequent to the challenger, he incurs the 
                                                 
22 The data allow a definition of incumbency that identifies at most one of the parties, so the model is 
consistent with data constraints, as well as presenting a strategic scenario simple enough to allow empirical 
investigation.  We test for strategic behavior only when the litigants exemplify a limited set of 
characteristics; if such behavior obtains (as it surely does) to other pairs, our results will be weaker, but not 
obviously biased.  Other simplifying assumptions discussed below are: (1) challengers obtain no benefits 
from delayed filing and (2) incumbents display a specific form of myopia in their actions.   
  16disadvantage of litigating from the junior party position.  He thus may choose to reduce 
or eliminate the optional delay.  Let t be the time at which the incumbent files his 
application, and let his utility from filing at time t be given by a quadratic loss function
23: 
   ┌  -θ(t – tI* )
2 - (1-θ)(t – tC)
2 if the incumbent is the junior party, 
   │   where 0 < θ ≤ 1 
(4.3) U(t)  =      │ 
   │  -(t – tI *)
2  if the incumbent is the senior party   
   └ 
 
  In the appendix we prove the existence of unique equilibrium strategies where 
challengers always set:  
(4.4) tC  = tC* = TC =  c + X1C γ1 + Z1 ω1 
  or:   c = tC  - X1C γ1 - Z1 ω1  
and the incumbent sets: 
(4.5) tI = tI* = TI +IncI γ* = i + X1I γ1 + Z1ω1 + IncI γ*    if tI* < tC  
(4.6) tI = θtI* + (1 – θ)tC   if tI* ≥  tC
To simplify the notation, we let IncI be a component of X1 which takes the value 0 when 
the party is not an incumbent.  This does not affect our analysis as IncI = 0 for 
challengers, leaving X1 as before for those firms.  Rewriting (4.6), 
(4.7) tI* = (1/θ)tI – ((1 – θ)/θ)tC = i + X1I γ1 + Z1ω1
  i = (1/θ)tI – ((1 – θ)/θ)tC - X1I γ1 - Z1ω1  
  A case can have two challengers, both of whom follow the strategy in (4.4), a 
junior party-challenger and senior party-incumbent, who follow strategies (4.4; 4.5) or a 
senior party-challenger and junior party-incumbent, who follow strategies (4.4; 4.7).   To 
simplify the notation, let A denote the senior party and B the junior party; a and b their 
                                                 
23 This formulation incorporates a “myopia” assumption that the senior party-incumbent ignores the fact 
that if he files earlier he would increase the disadvantage to subsequent junior party-challengers.    
  17invention dates, and f and g their filing dates. 
  The BPAI assigns legal invention dates α and β  to A and B which are based on 
admissible evidence and possibly other factors.
24  We model the BPAI ruling around the 
actual invention dates (a, b) but allow for possible systematic and idiosyncratic deviation. 
(4.8)  α = a + X2A γ2 + Z2 ω2 + εA
  β  = b + X2B γ2 + Z2 ω2 + εB
Deviations that vary systematically with observed inventor characteristics are 
captured by X2 γ2.  X2 include inventor characteristics such as whether the inventor is 
foreign.  If the BPAI has a ``foreign bias,” then the coefficient before the foreign variable 
should be statistically different from zero.  ε  reflects deviations in the BPAI ruling that 
are idiosyncratic to the specific interference case.  Lastly, Z2 are the characteristics that 
do not vary across inventors that affect BPAI priority rulings.  Similar to Z1 earlier, Z2 
has no bearing in our analysis as Z2 affects both α and β equally. 
We observe only the sign of α − β (i.e., who wins), and never observe the actual 
invention dates a and b.  Consequently, we estimate the key parameters (γ1, γ2) using a 
probit regression on whether the junior party wins, and substitute from equations (4.4), 
(4.5) and (4.7) for a and b.   
Let Y
* = α − β and Y = 1 if Y
* ≥ 0 (and Y = 0 if Y
* < 0).  Y is a binary variable 
indicating whether the junior party has an earlier legal invention date and consequently 
wins the interference.   
                                                 
24 Interference settlements assign property rights to a single party, and are approved by the BPAI.  Here, 
settlements are treated as equivalent to a BPAI ruling where the “winner” is the settled assignee, and 
“BPAI ruling” refers to the party who is assigned rights to the interference count.  This view is consistent 
with the assumption that settlements reflect the expectation of parties about what the BPAI decision would 
have been.  In other work we are modeling the settlement/litigate decision jointly with the property right 
assignment outcome. 
  18  When the incumbent is the senior party, we obtain: 
(4.9) Y
* = α − β = (i – c) + (X2I − X2C) γ2 + (εI−εC) 
or, letting I = A, C = B, tI = f and tC = g: 
  Y*  = (f − g) − (X1A − X1B) γ1 + (X2A − X2B) γ2 + (εA−εB) 
If the incumbent is the junior party, then 
(4.10) Y*  =  α – β =  (c – i) + (X2C − X2I) γ2 + (εC−εI) 
 =(  tC  - X1C γ1 - Z1 ω1 ) -  ((1/θ)tI – ((1 – θ)/θ)tC - X1I γ1 - Z1ω1 ) 
 +  (X2C − X2I) γ2 + (εC−εI) 
 =  (1/θ)(tC – tI) − (X1C − X1I) γ1 + (X2C − X2I) γ2 + (εC−εI) 
As the incumbent is the junior party, C = A, I = B, tC = f, and tI = g.  Rewriting equation 
(4.10): 
(4.11)  Y* = (1/θ)(f − g) − (X1A − X1B) γ1 + (X2A − X2B) γ2 + (εA−εB) 
  If neither inventors are incumbents, then  
(4.12) Y
* = α − β = (f – g) − (X1A − X1B) γ1 + (X2A − X2B) γ2 + (εA−εB) 
Combining (4.9), (4.11), and (4.12) gives the latent estimation equation: 
(4.13)   Y* = (1 - δ)  (f − g)  + δ (1/θ) (f – g)  − ( X1A – X1B)  γ1 + (X2A – X2B) γ2  
  +   (εA−εB) 
where δ = 1 when the incumbent is the junior party and δ =0 when the senior party is an 
incumbent or neither party is incumbent.   
 Let  ν =  (εA−εB).  We assume that ν, conditional on the observed (f, g, X1, X2), is 
distributed i.i.d. Normal with mean zero and finite variance across the interference cases.   
This i.i.d. assumption can be relaxed but not without sacrificing computational 
  19tractability.
25
  Given the above, the probability that the junior party (B) wins is: 
(4.14)  Prob { Y = 1 | f, g, X1, X2 } = Prob { Y
* ≥ 0 | f, g, X1, X2 }  
   = Prob { ν  ≥  (X1A – X1B) γ1 −  (X2A – X2B) γ2 – (1 - δ)(f − g)  - δ(1/θ)(f – g) } 
   = Φ [ {(1 - δ) (f − g)  + δ(1/θ)(f – g)  − ( X1A – X1B) γ1 + (X2A – X2B) γ2}/σ ] 
where δ = 1 when the incumbent is the junior party and δ =0 otherwise. 
Because α − β  is not observed, σ cannot be estimated.
26  Following standard 
convention, we set σ = 1.  After normalizing σ, the coefficient before (1 - δ) (f – g) need 
not be one.  Therefore, we estimate the following  
(4.15)  Prob { Y = 1 | f, g, X1, X2 }  
= Φ [ (1 - δ) τ (f − g)  + δ(1/θ) τ (f – g) − ( X1A – X1B)  τ γ1 + (X2A – X2B) τ γ2 ] 
The estimated coefficient before (1 - δ)(f – g) gives an estimate for τ, and the ratio of the 
estimated coefficients before (X1B – X1A, X2A – X2B) and the difference in filing dates (f 
− g) for cases where the junior party is not an incumbent provides an estimate for (γ1, γ2).  
Given the invariance property of maximum likelihood, the estimate of (γ1, γ2) is 
consistent but inference requires the use of asymptotic non-linear hypothesis testing. 
 
5. Incumbency and the impact of patent races on innovation: estimations 
                                                 
25 For example, ε  could cluster by technology classes.  This would imply a non-trivial covariance structure 
for ν and a simulation based estimation scheme.  The differencing strategy implies greater flexibility for 
our assumptions, as factors in common – Z1 and Z2 – are implicitly accounted for.  The mean zero 
assumption only relies on the proposition that the conditional means of ε do not vary between the two 
inventors, leaving us with E(εA−εB | f ,g, X1, X2) = 0. The i.i.d. assumption requires that the unobserved 
(inventor varying) factors, ε, affecting patent filing are themselves distributed i.i.d. across inventions and 
inventors. 
 
26 This is the usual scale problem associated with discrete choice models.  See Train (2003) section 2.5 
  20A number of case and party characteristics influence the outcome of a priority 
dispute.  Characteristics that affect the filing process and make-up X1 are measures of the 
incumbency and size of the assignee firms.  Characteristics that affect the BPAI ruling 
and make-up X2 reflect institutional and bureaucratic features of the BPAI and the patent 
interference process.  We explain the role of each below. 
5.1. Size and strategy – X1 
  The two components of X1 are size and incumbency.   If the claim about dilatory 
small parties is correct, then small parties should be disproportionately successful.  A 
small party, even as junior party, is likely to have invented first relative to larger firms 
who move to file with dispatch.  Alternatively, if large firms have – and seize – the 
opportunity to delay filing relative to smaller firms due to the liquidity constraints 
discussed above, or if they are advantaged in litigation, then ceteris paribus, they will be 
disproportionately successful.   
  The model allows only a test for the dominating factor among the two size 
hypotheses.  A zero coefficient could mean neither or both is present – conclusions with 
separate policy implications.  If the effects cancel out in the current patent regime, then 
large firms will be more successful if the U.S. moves to a first-to-invent regime, because 
their delay is voluntary whereas that of the small firm is not.   
  The patent portfolio data for each applicant at the time the interference is declared 
is a proxy for size.  The portfolios are adjusted to first, reflect average portfolio rates for 
all assignees who patent in the technology category
27 and second to have an overall mean 
of one.  We also consider two alternative size specifications.  The first is for firms who 
                                                 
27 Average portfolios are based on assignees in the NBER database.  The winning patent’s primary class 
identifies the technology category of each case. 
  21claim “small entity status” in their patent filings.  Entity status is based on the Small 
Business Administration employee-based measure; firms that qualify are eligible for 
reduced filing fees.
28  The second is for individual inventors versus applications assigned 
to corporations or governments.  The variable included in the estimation for each 
definition of size measures the difference between the junior and senior party. 
  The strategic argument implies that incumbent firms should be disproportionately 
successful relative to challengers because they hold off filing for a patent even when they 
have an invention in hand.  Our data do not allow a direct measure of incumbency, so 
instead we construct an index that measures the likelihood that a firm is incumbent.  The 
senior party is potentially incumbent when he bases priority on a parent application.  
These are a subset of the cases declared “for” the senior party.  We assume that when 
priority is based on a foreign patent the senior party is not an incumbent.  The junior 
party is a potential incumbent when the case is not “for” the senior party, that is, when 
the senior party has neither a parent patent or foreign patent priority claim. Potential 
incumbents are more likely to be actual incumbents if they are large.  Thus the 
incumbency index  is a product of the technology-adjusted patent portfolio size for the 
firm and a dummy variable indicating when either the junior or senior party is a potential 
incumbent. 
  The filing difference variables require a bivariate measure of incumbency.  Let 
the junior party be incumbent if, as before, the senior party does not base its priority 
claim on a parent or foreign patent, and in addition, if the junior party’s patent portfolio 
exceeds that of the senior party.  Finally, the incumbent must observe the senior party’s 
                                                 
28 Non-profit institutions, including universities, have inconsistent entity status, depending on what they 
plan to do with the patent in question.  They are included in the “large” category.  In estimations not 
reported here we tested whether they had any advantage in an interference, but found no systematic effects. 
  22patenting activity, so we require that the senior party have a patent at the time the 
interference is declared.
29  The resulting interaction term identifies ten percent of the 
sample as cases where the junior party might moderate the extent to which he delays 
filing due to strategic considerations. 
5.2. Institutional features – X2 
  Institutionally, the junior party has the burden of proof, and hence is at a 
disadvantage in all of these cases.
30  The key institutional control for this dataset is 
whether the firms are domestic or foreign.  During this period certain kinds of priority 
evidence had to be based on activities in the United States, so that foreign firms were 
formally disadvantaged in their attempts to establish first inventorship.
31   
 Included  in  X2 is a variable that measure the number of citations in the patent that 
wins the interference.  Citations in a patent relate the patent to previous technology and 
delineate the extent of the patent-holders’ rights and provide a measure of the extent to 
which a patent derives from previous inventions (many citations) or is a less derivative 
work (few citations).   
  The optimal method to reduce an invention to practice and prepare an application 
is more likely to be known to both inventors for a highly-citing patent, as the underlying 
technology for such patents is well-understood.  Consequently, there is no (good) reason 
for the elapsed time between invention dates and filing dates to differ between the parties.  
                                                 
29  Alternatively, we could assume that the JP observes filing dates for SP prior to patent issuance, and 
include these cases as well in the incumbency interaction term.  The results are qualitatively similar, with 
an estimate of σ closer to one, consistent with a noisier measure of incumbency. 
30 A further burden is imposed on the junior party if his application was filed after the senior party’s patent 
is issued; however, our data are currently too sparse to control for this problem.   
31  This situation was changed in 1996, but the discriminatory clauses remained in effect for evidence about 
inventions that pre-dated the change, which includes all of the cases in our sample.  We tested for whether 
the decision boards ruled more favorably towards foreign firms after the policy change, but found no 
statistical support for a change. 
  23Alternatively, the elapsed time for a patent with few citations could easily differ between 
two inventors, as one might pursue more dead-ends than the other.  Thus the BPAI is 
likely to be more receptive to a due diligence argument from junior parties when the 
invention has few citations than the converse so that the number of citations will be 
negatively correlated to the likelihood that a junior party wins the interference. 
5.3. Bureaucratic and technological controls – X2 
  Bureaucratic reluctance to admit error might confer an advantage on a patentee. 
While no formal advantage is given to patented status, an adverse decision in an 
interference will reverse a previous ruling of the USPTO.  Dummy variables are included 
for when a party has a patent, rather than application, in interference.   
  To the extent that filing and ruling differences across technology categories do not 
systematically differ across inventors (so are part of Z1 or Z2), technology category 
dummies should have no predictive power.  However, if the BPAI employs different 
standards to assess the claims of junior and senior parties by technology class, then they 
may belong in X2.   For example, patenting in new areas may be subject to a more 
relaxed standard of evidence, which would favor junior parties.  
5.4. Filing dates 
  The filing dates, f and g, are the benefit dates assigned to each party in the 
interference declaration, or the relevant filing dates for the count rather than the filing 
dates for the patent in interference.  The former dates are the targets for litigation, e.g., 
the junior party must prove that he invented prior to the benefit date of the senior party 
rather than the date that the senior party filed for the patent in interference.  The senior 
party always has an earlier priority date, so that the difference is always negative.  
  24According to the model developed in section 4, the associated coefficient should be 
positive.  Sample statistics are contained in Table 10. 
 
6.  Who innovates first: results 
  The results confirm the existence of strategic delay by incumbents in each of the 
specifications (see tables 11 and 12).  The Wald test statistics for significance of the ratio 
of the coefficient for incumbency to the coefficient for the difference in filing dates   
for the first specification in Table 11 is 5.22, which is significant at the 0.02 level.  The 
analogous test statistics for the two probit regressions in Table 12 are 3.13 and 3.29, 
significant at the 0.08 and .07 levels.   
  Interpreting the magnitude of this coefficient is not straightforward.  The variable 
is intended to capture the likelihood that the junior party is an incumbent.  A standard 
deviation increase in that measure is associated with about an eight percent increase in 
the likelihood that the junior party will be successful, roughly equivalent to his increased 
likelihood of success from a one-year reduction in the filing difference between the 
parties.  This in turn implies a lag between invention and filing of an additional year, or, 
equivalently, that his invention date is a year earlier than we would expect given his filing 
date and other characteristics.
32  Of course, there might be good reasons for the lag other 
than elective delay; what our analysis measures is simply that it took extra time, for some 
reason, for such junior parties to file a patent application.   
  The ratio of the two filing difference coefficients yields an estimate for θ of 
                                                 
32 The relevant filing difference coefficient is from the second specification in Table 11 as the incumbency-
difference variable pertains to all junior parties rather than the subset identified in the JP-incumbent filing 
difference variable in the first specification. 
  25approximately one-third.
33  We can estimate the extent to which the patent race 
moderates delay from this estimate.  Rewriting equation (4.6) where the incumbent is a 
junior party and the challenger is the senior party: 
(6.1)   g  =  θtI* + (1 – θ)f 
  t I* - g = (1/θ)g – g – ((1 – θ)/θ)f = ((1 – θ)/θ)(g – f) 
Absent competition, the incumbent would have delayed filing by an addition amount –  
(tI* - g) – equal to the actual filing difference multiplied by ((1 – θ)/θ).  The average 
filing difference for cases that fit this profile (junior party incumbent according to the 
criteria listed above) is 1.14 years.  Substituting in one-third for θ gives a multiple of two.  
Thus the impact of the patent race on filing is to accelerate the filing of the incumbent on 
average by two years. 
  Larger firms, other than those identified as incumbents, do not have an advantage 
in these cases: indeed, controlling for incumbency, smaller firms are more successful, 
which implies that they are slower to file for a patent than are larger firms.  However, the 
analysis provides only weak support for the claim by proponents of the U.S. system that 
first-to-invent encourages invention by small firms, start ups, or individual inventors.  
The variables measuring these independent inventors and (formally) “small” firms are 
insignificant in all specifications (table 12).  Furthermore, as discussed above, nearly all 
firms involved in interferences are very large indeed.  Thus the coefficient on the patent 
portfolio variable reflects an advantage of large over very large firms, rather than small 
over large.  Note also that the magnitude of the effect is modest: a standard deviation 
decrease in the portfolio size of the junior party relative to the senior party increases his 
                                                 
33 The final column in table 11 reports for comparison the estimation with a single filing difference 
coefficient. 
  26chances of winning by four percent. 
  The results also reveal other interesting characteristics of the interferences.  When 
the senior party has a patent, his chance for success increases by 10%, even though the 
formal burden of proof is identical in these cases to the all-applicant alternative.  Junior 
party patentees are not similarly advantaged. 
  The BPAI supports junior party patentees when their opponent bases his claim on 
a foreign patent, as is the case in a significant fraction of the cases where the junior party 
has a patent.  Here, the junior party obtains a net benefit of thirteen to fifteen percent by 
virtue of his opponent.  A senior party patentee going up against a foreign junior party is 
in great shape: the combination of a patent and a foreign opponent increases his chance of 
success by over 25%.   Worst off are junior parties who are not only foreign but also 
defending a foreign benefit date, which imposes an additional penalty of 9%.  Overall, 
foreign parties are deeply disadvantaged in these cases.  Whether the new regulations are 
more equitable is an important area for study. 
  Finally, while none of the technology categories are distinguished in the 
estimate
34, the citation measure makes a difference: each subtracted citation makes it a 
half percent more likely that the junior party will win.  A standard deviation decrease in 
patent citations increases the likelihood that the junior party wins by 6%.  Thus, it 
appears that the order of inventors and filers are likely to diverge – and inventors file 
second – for less derivative inventions.   
 
7. Conclusions. 
                                                 
34 In estimations not reported, inclusion of the technology categories are individually and jointly 
insignificant. 
  27  The patent race literature emphasizes positive rather than normative results: it 
analyzes incentives to increase investment or speed up invention rather than absolute 
changes in efficiency.  Incomplete property rights in invention mean that private 
investment, ignoring strategic considerations, is typically too low.  Thus whether a patent 
race ameliorates underinvestment, corrects for it, or overshoots it depends on the strength 
of patent rights and other features that are difficult to observe or measure.  While our 
results do not attempt to measure the welfare consequences of patent racing, they 
illustrate its two edges.   
  On one hand, if patent races are common – and we calculate that in certain 
technology categories they may be pervasive – then the investment in research may be 
inefficient.  The argument for the need for strong patent rights to support expensive 
research can be turned upside-down: rather, the results suggest that in some fields strong 
patent rights might induce, rather than support expensive research, and not necessarily 
with an increase in research productivity. 
  Alternatively, our results also illustrate the salutory effect of a race on innovation.  
While all firms may have an incentive to race to invent, we show that incumbent firms 
prefer to delay filing a patent application.  Competition for a patent cuts back on the 
benefits to delay, spurring innovation.  The less forgiving nature of the first-to-file system 
would presumably intensify the race to file as well as the race to invent. 
  This study offers some preliminary conclusions about how the first-to-invent and 
first-to-file patent systems differ in priority grants.  Assuming we prefer to reward 
inventors with a patent, rather than speedy filers, our study suggests that first-to-file will 
make more mistakes on inventions that are more innovative.  In consequence, the first-to-
  28invent system may in fact provide better incentives for fundamental invention than a first-
to-file system. 
  Like other critics, we do not find evidence that the system works to the benefit of 
small inventors or firms.  Small firms rarely avail themselves of the interference process.  
But if we assume that the winner of an interference is the first-to-invent, the results 
suggest that small inventors do not suffer from a filing disability.  Alternatively, there is 
some indication that other groups do have such problems – both the U.S. government and 
U.S. universities, for example, are far more likely to enter our sample as junior parties, 
yet they win a reasonable share of cases, which suggests that both institutions 
systematically take longer to file patent applications than do private firms and 
individuals.  However, we need more data to establish the trend statistically. 
  A troubling consequence of the first-to-invent system is that it lightly penalizes 
firms that are slow to file, as long as they are not too slow.  Instead of being used by 
virtuous small inventors, our data suggest that the system supports strategic incumbents 
who wish to defer filing for a patent, possibly deferring innovation and certainly 
deferring divulging the details of their innovations in patent filings and the dissemination 
of the information that the patent system requires as a quid pro quo for temporal 
exclusivity. 
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  32APPENDIX A: Estimating the rate of interference 
 
  Define the following terms: 
At, t = {1, … n} is the number of applications filed in period t.   (All of the definitions and 
conditions discussed here refer to a single technology class.) 
It, t = {1, … n} is the number of applications  filed in period t that are involved in an 
interference at some later time (also called “interfered applications”).  
Dt,s , s = {0, ..., n-1} is the number of interfered applications from period t that are 
declared in period t + s.  All interferences are declared within n-1  periods of the filing of 
the application. 
αt,s  equals the share of interfered applications from period t that are declared in period 
t+s. 
Thus: 
  Dt,0 + Dt, 1 + ... + Dt, n-1 = It;  αt,0 + ... + αt,n-1 = 1; and αt,s It =Dt,s  
Assume that the following conditions hold within technology categories:  
Assumption 1: The rate of interfering is constant, i.e., It/At = r for all  t  ε {1, … ,n}.  We 
are interesting in calculating r.
35
Assumption 2: The distribution of declaration dates for interfered applications is identical 
for applications filed in each period, i.e., αt,s = αv,s = αs for all t, v ε {1, ... , n}. 
  Our sample consists of all interferences declared during period n.  In period n we 
observe { D1, n-1 ,  D2, n-2 , ... , Dn, 0 }.  Substituting from the above definitions: 
  D1, n-1 /A1 +  D2, n-2 /A2 + ... +  Dn, 0 /An   = αn-1I1/A1 + αn-2I2/A2 + ... + α0In/An  
 =  αn-1r + αn-2r + ... + α0r = r 
                                                 
35 We abstract from patent office policy changes and exogenous changes in research activities.  Our 
conclusions rest on large differences among the rates, rather than subtle changes that would perhaps be 
overwhelmed by possible changes in PTO policies during this period.  
  33  Hence, we can recover the rate of interference by summing the weighted 
interfered applications from each prior period that are in interferences declared during a 
single period, where the weights correspond to the inverse of the total number of 
applications filed during the same year as the interfered applications.   
  The six years of interference declarations are broken into two 3-year periods to 
better capture the changes in the number of applications per category over time.  This 
gives two estimates of the rate, one for each subperiod, so that the calculated rate for each 
technology (column) is obtained as follows:  
rate (for each column)  = ½(Σt, s(Dts/Ats)), where Dts are the entries in the top part of the 
matrix and Ats in the lower part.   
  The sample includes 46.1% of all the interferences filed in this period, and 
estimates are accordingly inflated to account for the larger population of interferences.  
Omitted from the sample are interference design patent cases (less than 1%) and cases 
whose declaration was accelerated to 1987 or delayed beyond 1993. 
  Note that we use applications that mature to a patent, rather than all applications, 
in the denominator of our calculations.  There are roughly twice as many applications as 
patents, so using the latter standard would reduce the rates by half, and the relative 
incidence rate, of greatest interest for this paper, would remain unchanged.  We believe 
that the subset of applications that mature is a better measure for our purposes.  These 
applications are the set of patentable inventions that arrive at the PTO.  Each application 
in interference is in that set – except for the fact of the interference itself.  Interferences 
are only allowed among “patentable inventions” (see footnote 15, above).  In fact, out of 
the total sample of interferences less than eight percent resulted in no patent (coded as 
  34“both lose” in Table 2) and we suspect that if not for the interference they probably 
would have passed muster – indeed 75% of those cases started out with either the junior 
party or the senior party having a patent, from which the count or entire patent was 
invalidated in the course of the litigation.   
 
APPENDIX B: Filing Strategies. 
 
Cases I: neither party is an incumbent.  Then f = TA; g = TB, and  
(1.1)  α – β = (f – g) + (XB – XA)γ - YAγ
SP +  YBγ
JP  
Case II: One party is incumbent, the other is not. 
The incumbent’s utility for filing at time t is given by a quadratic loss function: 
U(t) = -θ(t – tI*)
2 - (1-θ)(t – f)
2 if the incumbent is the junior party, where 0 < θ ≤ 1 
 -(t  –  tI*)
2  if the incumbent is the senior party   
Lemma: Suppose the challenger files at time h.  The incumbent will choose to be the 
senior party if and only if tI* < h.   
Proof: Clearly, if tI* < h, then the incumbent will file at tI* and be the senior party.  So, 
suppose that tI* > h. 
The incumbent can be the senior party by pre-empting the junior party, t < h.  The 
derivative of the utility function of the incumbent as a senior party is U’(t) = -2(t – tI*) > 
0 for all t < h < tI*.  Therefore, conditional on deciding to pre-empt the junior party, the 
optimal choice of t for the incumbent is h-∆, for an arbitrarily small ∆. 
  The incumbent is the junior party for any choice of t > h.  The derivative of the 
utility function of the incumbent as a junior party is U’(t)|t = h = -2θ(t – tI*) > 0 (note that 
this is the limiting derivative from above and below)  Hence, the incumbent will choose a 
  35value t greater than h.  From the first order condition, the optimal t* for the incumbent 
conditional on being a junior party, is t* = θ tI* + (1-θ) h. 
 Given  tI* > h and ∆ → 0, the optimal utility for the incumbent from being a senior 
party,  -(h-∆− tI*)
2, is less than the optimal utility from being a junior party, -θ (1−θ) (tI*- 
h)
2.    Therefore, the incumbent always prefers to be the junior party when tI* > h. 
Case IIa: The senior party is incumbent.  Then  
  tI = tI* = TA
 t C = tC* = TB 
Case IIb: The junior party is incumbent.  Then B maximizes: 
  U(t) = -θ(t – tI*)
2 - (1-θ)(t – f)
2
  U’(t) = -2θ(t – tI*) – 2(1 – θ)(t – f) 
 t I = θ tI* + (1 – θ )f  > f 
 
Appendix C: Data Sources   
  The unit of observation for this study is an interference case.  Unfortunately, 
information concerning interference cases can only be obtained on a case-by-case basis 
from physical files maintained by the USPTO at the File Information Unit (FIU) in 
Arlington, Virginia.  As a consequence, we chose to use a random sample of the 
interference cases initiated by the BPAI between 1988 and 1994.  Interference cases 
during this period were assigned consecutive case numbers between 101,850 and 
103,300.  The case numbers are approximately chronological, with a few exceptions.   
We constructed a random list of 725 case numbers from the possible 1451 (50%).  We 
put in the file request at the FIU for each of these drawn case numbers.   
  36  For each successful file request, we collected the Interference Declaration, which 
identifies the parties, their priority dates, any assignees, addresses, counts, the patent or 
application claims that correspond to the counts, and the final judgment or final decision 
in each case.  We also obtained the dates for the declaration and case resolution, 
redeclarations, whether a final hearing was held, and other miscellaneous information.  
We use the original designation of parties when they switch in the course of the 
proceeding (that is, if the senior party is redesignated junior and vice versa).   When the 
declaration omitted assignee information we checked the PTO assignee database, at 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat. We coded for assignees only if the 
application or patent was assigned during the interference period or, when ambiguous, if 
the inventor clearly had a long-standing relationship with the assignee. 
  Some files are incomplete.  Interference dates and resolutions (but not priority 
dates, counts, or junior/senior designations) are also available from the USPTO External 
Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) web site at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/ .  The PAIR database also includes information on 
entity status and foreign priority.  Additionally, a subset of BPAI decisions is available at 
the USPTO-BPAI link and through the Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis administrative 
decisions database.  In total, we were able to obtain sufficient information for 668 case 
numbers from the sampled total of 725 (92%).  For the remaining 57, the staff at the FIU 
provided us with the numbers of the applications involved in the interferences from the 
Internal PAIR database.  We matched the numbers with external PAIR, and where 
possible, culled when and whether a patent was granted to the applicant, the beginning 
and ending interference dates, the interference outcome, and the technology category.  
  37The distribution of these case characteristics do not differ noticeably for the omitted 
cases, compared to the included cases. 
  Patent portfolio statistics are from the July 2005 Patent BIB DVD issued by the 
USPTO.  We matched all assignees with their assignee code and then searched for 
patents issued between 1975 and the case declaration date.  Using the same database, we 
searched for inventors’ patents using name and address identifiers (city, state and/or 
country).  Information on technology class and patent citations are from the winning 
patent.  When a winning application is superceded by a second application including the 
count technology (a child patent) we obtained class and citation information from the 
child patent.  We included a number of variables to capture possible trends in the patent 
portfolio and citation information (declaration date, winning patent date, patent 
application date) but found no significant trends in our sample.   
  38Table 1: Types of Interference Cases 
 
              








          
Senior party:  0  136  0  136 
          
Application 
Only 69  0  32  101 
Foreign Patent  85  0  228  313 
Parent Patent  34  0  84  118 
          
(First) Junior 
Party:  0 5  341  346 
          
Application 
Only  105 67  0 172 
Foreign Patent  52  34  1  87 
Parent Patent  31  30  2  63 
 188  136  344  668 
   28.14%  20.36% 51.50%   
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Table 2: Distribution of Outcomes by Technology Category, 
number and share 








Party Both None  Total 
Chemicals 112  61  18 8  199 
   56.28%  30.65%  9.05%  4.02%    
Communications 21  8  2  2  33 
& Computers  63.64%  24.24%  6.06%  6.06%    
Drugs - total  96  46  18  6  166 
   57.83%  27.71%  10.84%  3.61%    
     Biotech  23  17  9  0  49 
   46.94%  34.69%  18.37%  0.00%    
     Med Equip  23  4  1  4  32 
    71.88%  12.50% 3.13% 12.50%    
     Drugs-other  50  25  8  2  85 
   58.82%  29.41%  9.41%  2.35%    
Electrical 45  15  5  1  66 
   68.18%  22.73%  7.58%  1.52%    
Mechanical 64  30 6  8  108 
   59.26%  27.78%  5.56%  7.41%    
Other  52  23 3 12  90 
    57.78%  25.56% 3.33% 13.33%    
Total 390  183  52  37  662 
   58.91%  27.64%  7.85%  5.59%    
          
Table 3: Frequency of sample applicants 







percent    
US Corp.  767  55.82%  41.41%     
Foreign Corp.  366  26.64%  36.79%     
US Indiv.  111  8.08%  13.50%     
University 59  4.29%  1.40%     
Foreign Indiv.  36  2.62%  5.07%     
U.S. Govt.   15  1.09%  1.34%     
Foreign Govt, 
NP  20 1.46% 0.48%     
          
sources for Population Percents:       
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm#parta2_1b
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm  
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Table 4: 1976-1999 Assignee Patent 
Portfolios: Sample versus Population 







assignees)        
Mean 906.35  11.44         
Median 110  1         
Std Dev  2315.85  187.18         
Min 1  1         
Max 22011  22011         
Q75 624  3         
Q90 2302  9         
Q99 11882  119         
            
Table 5: 1991 Patent Portfolios: Comparison of Sample Assignees and All Assignees by 
Technology Category (NBER Data; assigned patents only) 
   All Assignees in NBER database  Sample Assignees 
Technology 




















Chemicals 20887  10.881  35.037  456  231.857  709.048 
Communication/ 
Computers  8980 9.747  65.419  263  155.099  1110.67 
Drugs 8525  7.236  58.821  338  75.355  838.941 
Electrical 18815  9.01  38.193  367  175.398  864.787 
Mechanical 33489  6.289  2999  423  134.225  757.355 
Other 38746  4.24  20.461  443  73.334  728.14 
            
Table 6: Per-case Mean Patent Portfolio at 
Declaration by Technology Category and Party      
   Junior Party  Senior Party All       
Chemicals 2,550  2,354  2,456       
Computers 1,573  1,853  1,709      
Drugs 877  737  814       
Electrical 2,499  1,707  2,121       
Mechanical 739  447  598       
Other 664  661  663       
Total 1,499  1,318  1,414       
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Table 7: Mean Patent Portfolio by Party and 
Case Type (std. dev. in parentheses) 
type of case:  Junior Party  Senior Party Freq. 
All Applicant  1483 (2728)  1425 (2773)  181 
JP Patentee  1565 (2826)  1404 (2797)  332 
SP Patentee  1318 (3047)  911 (2027)  132 
Total  1491 (2840)  1309 (2655)  645 
 
      
Table 8: Interference and Infringement Rates by 
Technology Category    
(cases per thousand patented applications)     
   Interference Rates  Infringement Rates     
     [1]  [2]     
All  6.27  10.7 19     
Chemicals  9.15  5.4 11.8     
Computers  3.04   25.6     
Drugs  21.34  20.1       
Electrical  3.47  9.6 15.4     
Mechanical  4.27  11.8 16.9     
Other  3.93  15.2 34.2     
Biotech  49.71     27.9     
Med Equip  11.68   34.6     
Drugs-
other  20.23     22.2     
(1) total for patent granted 1980 - 1984, Table 1, Lanjouw & Schankerman (2001).  
(2) total for patents granted 1978- 1995, Table 1, Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004). 
         
Table 9: Relative Interference and Infringement 
Rates by Technology Category    
(All = 1.00)     
   Interference Rates  Infringement Rates     
     [1]  [2]     
All 1.00  1  1.00     
Chemicals 1.46  0.50  0.62     
Computers 0.48    1.35     
Drugs 3.40  1.88         
Electrical 0.55  0.90  0.81     
Mechanical 0.68  1.10  0.89     
Other 0.63  1.42  1.80     
Biotech 7.93    1.47     
Med Equip  1.86    1.82     
Drugs-
other 3.23      1.17     
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Table 10: Sample Statistics             
Variable N  Mean/  *Share 
Std. 
Dev 
.       
Min Max 
JP win*  584  0.32    0.00  1.00 
difference in filing dates 
in years  584 -0.92  1.13  -10.47  0.00 
filing difference, JP 
incumbent  49 -1.14  1.61  -8.94  0.00 
filing difference, JP not 
incumbent  534 -0.89  1.07  -10.47  0.00 
Difference in 
incumbency  584 0.26  2.23  -11.23  19.98 
Backward citations  584  10.60  10.38  0.00  74.00 
JP patentee*  584  0.52    0.00  1.00 
SP patentee*  584  0.21    0.00  1.00 
SP foreign*  584  0.36    0.00  1.00 
SP benefit foreign*  584  0.34    0.00  1.00 
JP foreign*  584  0.26    0.00  1.00 
JP benefit foreign*  584  0.07    0.00  1.00 
JP inventor*  584  0.10        
SP inventor*  584  0.09        
JP small entity status*  584  0.15    0.00  1.00 
SP small entity status*  584  0.13    0.00  1.00 
Difference in patent 
portfolios, tech adjusted  584 0.21  2.46  -11.19  15.57 
  43Table 11: Probit Results for Strategic Filing Model 







 (Std. Err.)  dF/dx 
difference in filing 
dates(SP-JP)         
.229  
(.062) .079 
filing difference, JP 
incumbent 
 .689   













Backward citations  -.016  
(.006) 
4.33 
(.037)  -.0055 
-.016  
(.005)  -.006 
JP foreign*  -.355  
(.148) 
3.88 
(.049)  -0.167 
-.357  
(.148)  -.117 
JP benefit foreign*  -1.015 
 (.305) 
6.32 
(.012)  -0.085 
-1.009  
(.305)  -.251 
SP foreign*  -.043  
(.155) 
.08    
(.78)  -.015 
-.059  
(.154)  -.02 
SP benefit foreign*  .380  
(.155) 
4.20  
(.04)  .133 
.383  
(.155)  .136 
JP patentee*  .195  
(.146) 
1.69 
(.194)  .067 
.194  
(.146)  .067 
SP patentee*  -.204  
(.185) 
1.06 
(.304)  -.067 
-.324  







(.056)  -.023 
-.071  
(.029)  -.025 
constant  -.167  
(.141)       
-.151  
(.14)    
Number of obs  584       584    
obs. P       0.318    0.318 
pred. P       .290    .297 
        
Log likelihood  -330.49652       -331.903675    
*dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
** test for (variable coeff.)/(non-JP incumbent filing diff. coeff.) = 0 
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Table 12: Strategic Filing Probit Model, Alternative Size Specifications 
y = JP win 
Coeff (Std. 
Err.)  dF/dx 
Coeff (Std. 
Err.)  dF/dx 
filing difference, JP 
incumbent 
.704  
(.323)  .254 
.735  
(.323)  .252 
filing difference, non-JP 
incumbent 
.214  
(.063)  .073 
.220  




(.028)  .020 
.061  
(.028)  .021 
Backward citations  -.016  
(.006)  -.005 
-.016  
(.006)  -.005 
JP foreign*  -.317  
(.145)  -.103 
-.314  
(.145)  -.103 
JP benefit foreign*  -.99    
(.301)  -.244 
-1.006  
(.301)  -.246 
SP foreign*  -.057  
(.154)  -.019 
-.072  
(.154)  -.024 
SP benefit foreign*  -.317  
(.145)  .135 
.404  
(.154)  .143 
JP Patentee*  .109  
 (141)  .037 
.114  
(.141)  .039 
SP Patentee*  -.196  
(.186)  -.065 
-.194 
 (.185)  -.064 
JP Inventor – SP 
Inventor 
-.236  
(.163)  -.081      
JP small entity – SP 
small entity       
.042  
(.137)  .014 
constant  -.129  
(.140)    
-.133  
(.140)    
Number of obs  584     584     
obs. P     .318    0.318 
pred. P     .291    .291 
        
Log likelihood  -332.99652     -333.16864    
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    Appendix Table: Data for calculating interfering rates                   





Number of Interfered Applications from cohort years in Interferences Declared 1988 - 1993        
76-78              4 6 1 6 5 22        6
79-81                      21 1 15 1 9 6 53 7 2 6
82-84                      87 12 84 24 26 27 260 25 17 42
85-87                      163 28 150 46 68 68 523 51 25 74
88-90                      116 23 93 55 98 74 459 26 18 49
91-93                      11 4 7 7 12 8 49 5 2
Total number of Applications in Cohort Years that mature to a patent                
76-78    44,990 12,867  11,202 31,355  49,550            47,439 197,403 1,096 3,302 6,804
79-81              44,210  15,447  12,650 32,357  46,924 44,557 196,145 1,534 3,858 7,258
82-84              42,314  17,697  14,021 32,762  44,536 42,349 193,679 1,963 4,410 7,648
85-87              45,856  22,305  18,818 38,920  52,448 49,693 228,040 2,499 6,402 9,917
88-90              55,852  32,407  24,689 50,326  62,812 59,529 285,616 3,198 8,754 12,737










sample  9.15                    3.04 21.34 3.47 4.27 3.93 6.27 49.71 11.68 20.23
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